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This week in 1999, INSIGHTS reported on a second straight court loss for direct shippers that yr. After the Utah Appeals Ct ruled Utah could go after Beer Across America for shipping direct to residents, a St Louis judge granted injunction to stop Beer Nuts Inc, a NC-based beer club, from shipping to Missouri consumers until it had a MO license. Once again, regulators focused on ability of minors to get alc bevs direct to sway judge. "Oddly, direct shippers have won with wine, lost with beer" to date, noted INSIGHTS. This week in 2000, INSIGHTS reported that "another harbinger of so-called 'revolution'" to ship direct was falling flat. Peapod, then the largest online grocer, lost $29 mil in 1999 and was rapidly running out of cash. Co was searching for takeover offers, according to Wall St Journal. Peapod's independent auditor filed an SEC report that there was substantial doubt about co's ability to continue as "going concern." "Someday online groceries may work, but first someone has to make $$," wrote INSIGHTS. Peapod closed operations in several Midwest states that year and was folded entirely into Giant food stores digital operations by 2002.This week in 2003, "Hopefully, It Can't Happen Here," headlined INSIGHTS, as we reported on decline of beer market in Germany. Germany was #3 beer mkt worldwide and had continued to decline in 2002 after declining 5 of last 6 yrs, according to govt stats in Brauwelt mag. German beer biz was down 4 mil bbls, 4% in last 5 yrs as young German drinkers moved away from beer. German beer mkt was at 91 mil bbls in 2002. Germans spent more on wine than beer for 1st time ever in 2001, reported Reuters. That gap widened in '02. Obviously, INSIGHTS (and most industry observers) could not have imagined at the time the magnitude of the declines the US beer industry would endure 20+ yrs later. As noted in our just-published Beer Industry Update, US shipments have shed 32 mil bbls, 14.7% in just the past 4 yrs. At just over 183 mil bbls in 2025, US shipments were at the lowest level since 1985.This week in 2007, Miller exec veep Tom Cardella was first top supplier exec we heard blast the notion that industry was evolving to one distrib per mkt. He told Miller distribs that would not be good for them, for Miller, retailers or customers. Most of those one distrib mkts would be "AB dominated" with August Busch IV "calling the shots." Single-house distribution would also destroy family legacies and put beer biz on "fast track to direct shipments," said Tom, as one-stop distribution would lead big retailers to challenge 3-tier laws. He added Miller supported a viable 3-tier system and would help facilitate "appropriate consolidation."This week in 2008, AB recognized reality that where their distribs were unable to get aligned brands (such as InBev, Grolsch, etc), a number of them found it necessary to sell competing high-end brands. So, AB announced its "voluntary 2008 Alignment Incentive Program." AB distribs who had been "unsuccessful in acquiring non-aligned AB Brands" could sell up to 3% of their "total volume in competitive malt and non-alcohol brands" and still be eligible for some exclusivity incentives. Those incentives were less than for those distribs that remained exclusive. For example, "A" exclusive distribs would get 2 cents per case for being exclusive, but those "B" distribs who sell up to 3% of competing brands where they can't get all aligned brands would get 1 cent. "A" distribs got 6 days of credit, but this new "B" class received 4 days. Those who don't meet those criteria were called "C" distribs and they got zilch.This week in 2010, broker/consultant Andy Christon said recent Coke/Pepsi consolidations "re-affirm" value of distrib rights/roles. Coca-Cola spent $12 bil for CCE's US biz and PepsiCo spent $7.8 bil for remaining stakes in its 2 biggest bottlers. Deals allowed Coke and Pepsi to "cut costs, be more flexible on pricing and offer mega-retailers better and more uniform deals." Lotsa folks wondered, a bit nervously, whether big brewers would make similar moves to buy out their distribs. But Andy focused on other key messages from the deals, including one of his pet themes, value of "golden cases" from smaller suppliers. Indeed, Pepsi paid a premium ($900 mil) to Dr Pepper Snapple to keep "perpetual exclusive rights" to DPS brands in territories where those bottlers operated. And many expected Coke to do same. Pepsi deal "also potentially lays the foundation for similar arrangements in the beer industry, by showing that a competitor may handle another brand owner's brands on an exclusive, perpetual basis without conflict - an interesting twist in distribution," wrote Andy.

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